Disclosure of donor conception, age of disclosure and the well-being of donor offspring by Pennings, Guido
Human Reproduction, Vol.32, No.5 pp. 969–973, 2017
Advanced Access publication on March 15, 2017 doi:10.1093/humrep/dex056
OPINION
Disclosure of donor conception, age
of disclosure and the well-being
of donor offspring
Guido Pennings*
Department of Philosophy, Ghent University—Bioethics Institute Ghent, Blandijnberg 2, Gent B-9000, Belgium
*Correspondence address. Tel: +32 16 620 767; Fax: +32 16 620767; E-mail: Guido.Pennings@UGent.be
Submitted on January 17, 2017; resubmitted on February 17, 2017; accepted on March 2, 2017
ABSTRACT: The matter of disclosure of donor conception to donor offspring is a very contentious issue. A frequently mentioned argument
is that disclosure is in the best interest of the child. The objectives of this paper are 2-fold: ﬁrst, to ﬁnd out whether there are any measure-
able, stable differences in the psychological well-being of donor offspring who are informed of the mode of their conception compared to
those who are not, and second, to ﬁnd out what is being done with the evidence. We found that there exists no empirical evidence of differ-
ences in psychological well-being of donor offspring in disclosing or nondisclosing families. Regarding the age of disclosure, the ﬁndings are
inconclusive. Some studies indicate no difference and some show slight positive effects of early disclosure. We also found that authors tend
to ignore their own ﬁndings when formulating recommendations and that the recommendations are based on implicit moral premises. We
conclude that disclosure, and directive counseling towards disclosure, cannot be justiﬁed by the welfare of the donor offspring.
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Introduction
The matter of disclosure of donor conception to donor offspring is a
very contentious issue. All kinds of arguments can be advanced for and
against disclosure. An argument that is frequently mentioned in the
debate is that disclosure is in the best interest of the child. This paper
will answer the question formulated by Klock: ‘Are there any measure-
able, stable differences in the psychological well-being of donor off-
spring who are informed of the mode of their conception compared
to those who are not?’ (Klock, 2013). Given this focus, I will ignore
deontological arguments such as ‘the child has the right to know about
his or her donor conception’ or ‘it is wrong to lie’, because deonto-
logical arguments cannot be falsiﬁed or corroborated by empirical evi-
dence. I will focus on the psychosocial studies to ﬁnd out whether
there is evidence to show that disclosure of donor conception is in the
best interests of donor offspring.
Telling or not-telling
Three different lines of information would help to answer the question:
a comparison in well-being between children who have been told and
those who have not; information on the well-being of children who
have not been told, and information on children who have been told.
The latter two lines of information are less useful to answer our
question since we can no longer compare: we can no longer say that it
is better to disclose or not to disclose but only that it is good or that it
does not harm the offspring to do one or the other. I present the data
starting with the studies of children who were not told, then studies on
the comparison between those who were told and those who were
not, and ending with those who were told, including the age of telling.
Information on children not told
Many studies performed around the turn of the century compared
families created through different methods of conception. These stud-
ies have shown that there were no signiﬁcant differences in parent-
child relationships or child development in donor-conceived families
when compared with natural conception or IVF families (Golombok
et al., 1996, 1999; Murray et al., 2006; Owen and Golombok, 2009).
All these papers are presenting the results of a single longitudinal study
looking at the children at the ages of 6, 12 and 18. Nevertheless, these
studies are an important source of evidence on the effects of nondis-
closure since the families participating in these studies had either not
disclosed the donor origin to their offspring or very few of them had
done so. In none of these studies, indications were found that these
children had psychological problems. In summary, there are no negative
consequences in the parent-child relationship or child development
because of nondisclosure of the child’s donor origin (Klock, 2013).
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However, one has to keep in mind that, apart from the Owen and
Golombok study, the participants in all studies were (pre)adolescents.
Extrapolation into adulthood is not possible. In addition, the single ori-
gin of the papers makes it all the more important that other scholars
conduct similar research in other countries and settings.
Comparison between told and not told offspring
There are only ﬁve publications that compared disclosing and nondi-
sclosing families. I leave out the studies in which comparisons are
made between parents who intended to tell and those who did not
because evidence shows that intention to tell does not mean they will
actually tell (Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics, 2013). The ﬁrst study is by
Golombok et al. (2002) who compared the children (aged 11-12
years) who had been told (only 8.5%) with those who had not been
told and did not ﬁnd differences for the variables related to parent-
child relationships and children’s socio-emotional functioning. In a
second publication from the same group, children who were unaware
of their donor origins did not show higher levels of adjustment pro-
blems. On the contrary, children who were told and whose mothers
were distressed showed greater adjustment difﬁculties (Golombok
et al., 2013). Freeman and Golombok (2012) looked into a small
unbiased sample of children aged between 10 and 14 years. In this
study, no signiﬁcant differences were found between the psychological
well-being of the children who were told and those who were not
told. Some differences were found in parent-child relationships: dis-
closure was associated with lower levels of conﬂict between mothers
and sons, and with less warm father-child relationships. Kovacs et al.
(2015) also in a unbiased group, found no signiﬁcant and clinically rele-
vant differences in parent-child relationships and child well-being
between the told and not told group. The most recent study by Ilioi
et al. again shows no overall differences between disclosing families
and either nondisclosing or natural conception families (Ilioi et al.,
2016). This study looked at the variables relating to quality of parent-
ing, quality of mother-child relationships, global family functioning and
adolescent psychological adjustment. In summary, no signiﬁcant differ-
ences regarding child well-being were found.
Information on children being told
This part is divided in offspring being told early and those being told
late. A major problem here is that different ages are adopted to deﬁne
early and late telling. Some studies make distinctions between before
12, between 12 and 17 and after 18 (Hammarberg et al., 2015), others
between before 3, between 4 and 6, and between 7 and 14 (Ilioi et al.,
2016), and still others before and after 18 (Jadva et al., 2009;
Mahlstedt et al., 2010). From a theoretical point of view, these limits
may have different implications. Some clarity and consensus would be
useful for future research. Moreover, it has been pointed out that dis-
closure is a gradual process that, in different layers, may go on for
years. Does ‘early’ and ‘late’ than refer to the start of the process or
the completion of the process?
The studies indicate that children who have been told about their
donor conception in their preschool years are doing ﬁne and mostly
react with curiosity or disinterest to the information (Rumball and
Adair, 1999; Lycett et al., 2005; MacDougall et al., 2007). The evidence
for the older group (adolescence or adult) generally presents a more
negative picture (Turner and Coyle, 2000; Nufﬁeld Council on
Bioethics, 2013). In this group, many donor-conceived persons felt
negative emotions such as shock, anger and confusion when learning
of their donor conception (Jadva et al., 2009). The negative effects of
telling late play an important role in the whole debate since they are
used as an argument to tell early and as an argument to tell. The latter
point, however, only makes sense if one assumes that a (large) number
of the donor conceived will ﬁnd out anyway, through accidental or
inadvertent disclosure by others or after genetic testing. Although
anecdotal evidence exists about such disclosures, no reliable informa-
tion is available on the frequency or extent of this happening.
The results on late disclosure should be interpreted with caution.
First, almost all studies recruited participants from donor offspring sup-
port groups. This clearly leads to a selection bias both in terms of atti-
tude and in terms of convictions about certain factors like the
importance of genetic information. Second, no unbiased information is
available on donor offspring who found out at a later age. It is possible
that many people who found out late do not have psychological pro-
blems and thus keep under the radar. Third, when all studies on the
effects of age of disclosure are brought together, the conclusion seems
to be that the effect of age of disclosure is at best small. Three studies
demonstrate no difference between children who have been told early
versus children who have been told late in life (Paul and Berger, 2007;
Mahlstedt et al., 2010; Hammarberg et al., 2015) versus two studies
that demonstrate more negative effects of being told late (Jadva et al.,
2009; Ilioi et al., 2016). Hammarberg et al. (2015) found that recalled
age at which they learned about the mode of conception was not asso-
ciated with the offsprings’ current subjective well-being or parental
relationship. It is, however, unclear from this paper whether this ﬁnd-
ing was also true for those conceived with donor gametes. Mahlstedt
et al. (2010) found no signiﬁcant relationship between age at disclosure
and attitude toward donor conception in participants who were part
of a support group. In the third study by Paul and Berger (2007), no
association was found between age at time of disclosure, thus challen-
ging theoretical and clinical beliefs that early disclosure is beneﬁcial to
family functioning. Two studies reported positive effects correlated
with earlier age of disclosure. The ﬁrst study reported more negative
feelings at the moment of questioning in the group who had been told
after the age of 18 (Jadva et al., 2009) and the second study showed
higher levels of psychological well-being in those who learned about
their genetic origins before age seven compared to those who were
told after age 7 (Ilioi et al., 2016). Taking all these studies together, no
clear conclusion about age of disclosure can be drawn.
Findings and conclusions/
recommendations
When studying the relationship between ﬁndings on the one hand and
conclusions/recommendations on the other hand in the debate on
disclosure, two points are interesting: a large deviation or contradic-
tion between the ﬁndings and the conclusions/recommendations, and
conclusions based on implicit moral premises.
First, there seems to be a trend of authors to ignore their own ﬁnd-
ings and reservations when it comes to drawing conclusions or making
recommendations. Some examples (quotes are used to ensure that no
distortion in reformulation would slip in): Kovacs et al. (2015) found
no signiﬁcant and clinically relevant differences in parent-child relation-
ships and child well-being between the told and not told group. As a
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conclusion, the authors state that ‘although there is no evidence that
nondisclosure detracts from the well-being of parents and donor-
conceived children, there is a culture of valuing openness in contem-
porary Australian families and other important motives for telling DI
children about their conception, including a belief that a child has a fun-
damental right to be told, wanting to avoid the burden of guarding the
secret and a desire to prevent accidental discovery’. One wonders
why they have done the study in the ﬁrst place. A similar reasoning
pattern can be found in Golombok et al. (2011): ‘No differences
between family types were found for maternal negativity, showing that
conﬂict and hostility between mothers and children is no higher in non-
disclosing than disclosing gamete donation families or natural concep-
tion families. In addition, the children were found to be functioning
well.’ (…) ‘The less positive interaction between mothers and children
in nondisclosing families was not associated with emotional or behav-
ioral problems in the children, given that no differences were found
between the nondisclosing families and the other family types for any
of the measures of child psychiatric disorder’ (Golombok et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, the conclusion by the authors was that ‘the ﬁndings of
the present study similarly suggest that assisted reproduction families
may beneﬁt from disclosure to children about the nature of their con-
ception before they enter school’. The ﬁnal example comes from the
Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics that agrees that the evidence is patchy
and that children are doing well until early adolescence, but still states
that there is ‘sufﬁcient evidence to point to the conclusion that, other
things being equal, it will usually be better for children to be told, by
their parents and at an early age, that they are donor-conceived’
(Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics, 2013). The logical conclusion from ‘no
difference’ or insufﬁcient evidence is that no recommendations can be
issued, or at best, that all options are equally good. It seems that the
authors’ moral convictions, i.e. that parents should disclose and the
child has a right to know, can easily survive non-ﬁtting or contradictory
empirical ﬁndings.
Second, the conclusions/recommendations can only be reached
when implicit moral premises are introduced. It is a basic rule in ethics
that normative conclusions cannot be deduced from descriptive
(empirical) premises. This is only possible when at least one normative
premise is added. Let me give a simple example. Empirical premise:
smoking endangers the health of smokers. Normative conclusion: we
should discourage or forbid smoking. This conclusion cannot be drawn
without adding a normative premise like ‘health is good’. In the debate
on disclosure, many normative premises are assumed but rarely made
explicit. One study found ‘lower mother–child mutuality and maternal
positivity in donor insemination and egg donation families in which the
child was unaware of his or her donor conception in comparison to
naturally conceived families’ (Casey et al., 2013). In another, late dis-
closure was associated with higher levels of distress in offspring (Jadva
et al., 2009). What do such ﬁndings imply? Does this mean that parents
should tell and tell early? No, unless one introduces a normative rule
such as: ‘Parents should (have a moral obligation to) avoid those things
(actions, decisions …) that cause (are linked to) negative feelings in
their offspring’. Or, put in a positive way: ‘Parents should (have a moral
obligation to) do those things that increase (might lead to) positive
feelings in their offspring’. This rule cannot be adopted as such. First,
there are then hundreds of things that parents should be doing or
should avoid doing. We would end up in an absurdly demanding situ-
ation. Second, the rule ignores the fact that negative feelings in children
are frequently an inevitable consequence of actions, events, and deci-
sions in a family and they may be justiﬁed by connected positive conse-
quences for the children and other people involved. Research has
shown that children in lesbian households suffer from stigmatization
because of their parents’ sexual orientation (Bos and Van Balen,
2008). If we apply the rule above, we should recommend that lesbian
women should not have children. Third, in many instances we will ﬁnd
both positive and negative effects of disclosure. In the Freeman and
Golombok study, disclosure was simultaneously associated with lower
mother-son conﬂict and less warm father-child relationships (Freeman
and Golombok, 2012). So what do we value most? It is worth pointing
out that in all studies we are talking about gradual differences well
within the range of normality. Nevertheless, the underlying idea seems
to be that parents should try to have the best possible, warmest and
least conﬂictuous relationship with their child. And this, presumably,
will lead to the happiest child.
The main problem with the implicit rule is that it is based on a maxi-
mizing principle. All these problems can be solved by adopting a
threshold of harm principle rather than to try to maximize child well-
being: parents should not do those things that have a high chance of
leading to serious harm (Pennings, 1999). This is the degree of parental
autonomy we also respect in natural reproduction. And this threshold
of harm is certainly neither reached in the case of nondisclosure, nor in
case of late disclosure.
Theoretical arguments
Within the debate on disclosure, several theories are appealed to: the
effects of family secrets on family functioning, theories about identity
formation, etc. In the introduction to papers on disclosure, one keeps
repeating these points and theories even though the ﬁndings from the
empirical research cast doubts on them. Take family secrets as an
example. It has been argued that secrecy will have an adverse effect on
family relationships and, consequently, on the child (Golombok et al.,
2011). However, as far as the present evidence goes, this belief has pro-
ven to be false in the case of donor conception. The studies that com-
pared disclosing and nondisclosing families showed no differences,
neither in child well-being, nor in parent-child relationships. So the claim
made by counselors and psychologists that secrecy interferes with rela-
tionship dynamics and child adjustment has been shown to be wrong, at
least in the early and middle childhood years (Kovacs et al., 2015).
There are many possible reactions to a discrepancy between empirical
ﬁndings and theoretical positions. One possibility is that the theory is
wrong and should be amended. Many people and families conceal a
secret: it is inherent to human interaction (Vangelisti and Caughlin,
1997). Recent research has shown that whether or not a secret is harm-
ful depends (amongst other things) on the motivation for keeping the
secret. Caughlin and Aﬁﬁ found for instance that when the motivation
for avoiding a topic was the protection of the relationships, a diminish-
ment in negative association between avoidance and dissatisfaction
appeared (Caughlin and Aﬁﬁ, 2004). If none of the, admittedly scarce,
empirical studies demonstrate negative effects of nondisclosure, it seems
to be time to either revise the theory or to look for an explanation.
After reviewing the evidence, one starts wondering where this consen-
sus on the effects of disclosure on the child’s well-being among counse-
lors and psychologists comes from. A possible explanation, one that
comes forward in the report by the Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics, is that
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they attach too much weight to the opinion of a certain part of one party,
i.e. donor offspring linked to donor offspring support groups. As I men-
tioned above, the negative effects are only conﬁrmed in a preselected
group of people and moreover, it assumes that people will ﬁnd out late,
which is not demonstrated. Another possible answer is that their position
has little to do with science or evidence but everything with their moral
convictions (Nordqvist, 2014). They believe that parents should be hon-
est with their child, that the child has a right to know, etc. There is noth-
ing wrong with holding these convictions but they should be open about
it. They should not pack these claims in a psychological bag, presented as
scientiﬁc fact. The fault that was made at the start of the introduction of
sperm donation is now repeated in the reverse direction. Then it was
claimed without any evidence that disclosure may be damaging for the
child’s psychological and social well-being. Now it is claimed, again with-
out any evidence, that disclosure is in the best interest of the child.
Evidence-based advice still remains a far-away dream.
This moral conviction of counselors and psychologists can also be
seen in the negative attitude towards nondisclosing parents. It is fre-
quently mentioned that a group of parents would like to disclose but
are uncertain about how and when to do it (Hammarberg et al.,
2015). Many papers are dedicated to designing ways and methods to
help these parents disclose (Leeb-Lundberg et al., 2006). However,
not one single article gives advice on how parents who do not want to
disclose can be helped. If counselors would be morally neutral and not
impose their values on parents, they would also try to better prepare
parents who do not want to tell. This could be done by training them
in giving convincing answers to the children’s questions, by pointing
out to parents at which points in their child’s life they may expect
questions, by running through scenarios that are likely to bring up the
subject and by helping them to build a coherent and easy to maintain
story. Such training and practice could help parents to uphold their
story without topic avoidance so that negative effects of topic avoid-
ance on family functioning can be avoided (Paul and Berger, 2007).
Conclusion
The question ‘are there any measureable, stable differences in psycho-
logical well-being of donor offspring who are informed of the mode of
their conception compared to those who are not?’ should be answered
in the negative. Given the lack of evidence, the current directive position
on disclosure is in essence a moral conviction, based on mainly deonto-
logical arguments. The absence of evidence of harm to children should
in a pluralistic society be a reason for restraint. For counselors and prac-
titioners, this restraint is moreover strongly supported by the general
principle of non-directiveness. For the government, restraint is appropri-
ate out of respect for the moral convictions of others, in this case the
parents. There might be good reasons to argue for disclosure but the
best interest of the child is not one of them.
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